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I. INTRODUCTION***
The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (H.R. 9)1
was enacted on July 27, 2006. H.R. 9 extends Section 5 and Section
203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) for an additional 25
years. In addition to reauthorizing Section 5 and other VRA provi-
sions that were scheduled to expire in 2006, and making additional
necessary changes in the VRA, H.R. 9 amended Section 5 to correct
problems created by Supreme Court decisions in Reno v. Bossier Par-
ish IF and Georgia v. Ashcroft.3 The amendments are intended to
restore "the original purpose of section 5."4 In enacting H.R. 9, Con-
gress noted that
[t]he effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been signifi-
cantly weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Reno v. Bossier Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft, which have miscon-
strued Congress' original intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and narrowed the protections afforded by section 5 of such Act.5
After providing some background information on Section 56 and
the reauthorization process, this article will discuss the problems cre-
ated by the Supreme Court decisions in Bossier Parish H and Ash-
croft. Thereafter, this article will discuss the Section 5 clarification
provisions in H.R. 97 intended to eliminate the negative impact of
Bossier Parish H and Ashcroft. Finally, this article will discuss
whether these "clarifications" will hold and how the reauthorization
process and clarification might impact renewed litigation to invalidate
*** This article is the second in a series on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The
first article, Georgia Photo Id Requirement: Proof Positive Of The Need To Extend Section 5, 28
N.C. Cent. L.J. 172 (2006), provides more complete information on the mechanics of Section 5
enforcement.
1. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577. See also,
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, And Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
And Amendments Act of 2006, Report To Accompany H.R. 9, Committee on the Judiciary,
House Report 109-478 (May 22, 2006) [hereinafter House Report]; Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa
Parks, And Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization And Amendments Act of
2006, Report To together with Additional Views To Accompany S. 2703, The Committee on the
Judiciary, Senate Report 109-295 (July 26, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Report].
2. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (Bossier Parish 11), 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
3. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
4. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, And Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthoriza-
tion and Amendments Act of 2006 (Part I), Hearing on H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (May 4, 2006) [hereinafter May 4,
2006 Hearing] (statement of Hon. Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution).
5. § 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. at 578 (emphasis added).
6. For additional background information on Section 5, see David H. Harris, Jr., Georgia
Photo Id Requirement: Proof Positive Of The Need To Extend Section 5, 28 N.C. Cent. L.J. 172
(2006).
7. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
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Section 5. This article will not discuss the improvements in protec-
tions for language minorities and federal observers, which are very
significant.
II. THE UNMET PROMISE THAT SECTION 5 ATrEMPTS TO CURE
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,8 rati-
fied in 1870, was intended to grant the right to vote to former slaves,
and their progeny, by prohibiting the federal, state, and local govern-
ments from denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race
or former state involuntary servitude.9 History's painful lesson has
shown that mere adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment has not
worked.' Contemporary history teaches us that even with numerous
statutes on the books to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, including
the VRA, resistance to universal, non-racist, suffrage continues and is
intensifying."
Exasperated with nearly 100 years of overt efforts by states, espe-
cially Southern states, to ignore the command of the Fifteenth
Amendment by continuing to block black voters from the ballot box,
and/or ensuring that their votes were not counted or did not carry the
same weight as those of white voters,12 Congress, especially in the face
of bloodletting shown on national television, was forced to act.
On March 7, 1965, about 600 Black men and women and a few young
children attempted to peacefully march from Selma, Alabama, to
Montgomery, to the State capitol, to dramatize to the world that peo-
ple of color wanted to register to vote; and the world watched as we
were met with nightsticks, bullwhips, we were trampled by horses, and
tear gas. Eight days after what became known as Bloody Sunday,
President Johnson spoke to a joint session of Congress. He con-
demned the violence in Selma and called on Congress to enact the
Voting Rights Act. 3
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2.
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
9. Id.
10. See David H. Harris, Jr., supra note 6 (discussing the adoption of the government issued
only photo ID requirement as a prerequisite to voting).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., May 4, 2006 Hearing, supra note 4; House Report, supra note 1; Senate Report,
supra note 1.
13. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act - History, Scope, and Purpose Vol. 1: Hearing on
H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2
(2006) [hereinafter History, Scope, and Purpose] (statement of Rep. John Lewis from the State
of Ga.).
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The above-described incident and other incidents of violence inflicted
against blacks citizens who sought to register and vote were a national
disgrace seen around the world.
A major factor leading to the enactment of the VRA was frustra-
tion with the fact that when individual litigation successfully ended
one discriminatory practice, "local authorities circumvented court or-
ders by implementing new procedures with the same discriminatory
result."14 Piecemeal litigation was not meeting the goal.15 In his
statement to the House of Representatives in support of H.R. 9, Rep-
resentative Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the Committee on the Judici-
ary, stated, "The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 to address our
country's ignoble history of racial discrimination and to ensure that
the rights enunciated in the Constitution became a practical reality for
all Americans. 1 6
Congress enacted the VRA 17 pursuant to its enforcement powers
granted to it under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 2
empowers Congress to enforce the Amendment "by appropriate
legislation."18
The sentinel innovation in the VRA, and the one most hated by
Southern states, is Section 5.19 Section 5 requires states and jurisdic-
tions with the most egregious histories of racial voter discrimination,
identified pursuant to a formula postulated in Section 420 of the VRA
and implementing regulations" ("covered jurisdictions"), to first seek
and obtain approval before implementing any new qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect
to voting ("voting change"). 22 Approval can only be acquired by a
declaratory judgment issued by a three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia 23 or from the Attor-
ney General pursuant to the administrative preclearance procedures
of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).2 4 If a declaratory
judgment action is filed, the DOJ will litigate the declaratory action
and either support or oppose the court's approval of the voting change
14. Id. at 78 (statement of Anita Earls, Dir. of Advocacy, Ctr. for Civil Rights).
15. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
16. Press Release, U.S. H. of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sensenbrenner House Floor
Statement on Voting Rights Act Extension (July 13, 2006), http://judiciary.house.gov/
printshop.aspx?Section=110).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (2006).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
20. Id. § 1973b(b).
21. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 51 (2006).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; History, Scope, and Purpose, supra note 13, at 9 (testimony of Brad-
ley J. Schlozman, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
24. Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 51.10.
20071
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at issue.25 The voting change does not become effective unless and
until judicial or administrative approval is secured.26 The DOJ is also
empowered to seek injunctive relief to block implementation of any
voting change that has not been precleared pursuant to Section 5.27
There are sixteen states covered under Section 5.28 Nine states are
covered in whole: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia;29 however, ten coun-
ties in Virginia have been allowed to "bail out" of Section 5 cover-
age.3° Seven states are covered in part: California, Florida, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota.31
Most requests for Section 5 approval are submitted for preclearance
to the Attorney General to save time and expense. 32 The Voting Sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ is delegated authority to
review these submissions.33 The Voting Section receives 4,000 to 6,000
submissions each year.34 Since the VRA was enacted in 1965, the
DOJ has received 121,000 Section 5 submissions.35 Out of the 121,000
submissions, the Attorney General has objected to just over 14,000.36
Nevertheless, in the last ten years there have been only thirty-seven
objections.37
Section 5 is a sore point with covered jurisdictions as they perceive
it as an intrusion into their rights as state and local governments - the
federalism argument. 38 Other jurisdictions argue that continued exis-
tence of Section 5 punishes them for past "sins" that they no longer
commit.39 Both arguments are disingenuous. Section 5 was originally
25. CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SECTION 4 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/sec_4.htm; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; History, Scope, and Purpose,
supra note 13, at 9 (testimony of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights
Div., Dep't of Justice).
26. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10; History, Scope, and Purpose, supra note 13, at 9 (testimony of Brad-
ley J. Schlozman, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
27. 28 C.F.R. § 51.62.
28. 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. History, Scope, and Purpose, supra note 13, at 9 (testimony of Bradley J. Schlozman,
Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
33. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3.
34. History, Scope, and Purpose, supra note 13, at 9 (testimony of Bradley J. Schlozman,
Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 9.
38. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
39. See, e.g., Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Gonzales, No.
1:06-cv-01384-PLF (D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 2006) (action seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgment
declaring Section 5 unconstitutional as an overextension of Congress's enforcement power to
remedy past violations of the Fifteenth Amendment).
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intended to be temporary-five years.4" However, Congress, after ex-
tensive hearings and data collection, has found it necessary to
reauthorize and expand Section 5 and other "temporary provisions"
of the VRA in 1970, 1975, 1982, 1992 (with respect to language assis-
tance), and now in 2006.41
The adjudicative authority given to the DOJ pursuant to Section 5
is perhaps the most extensive delegation of judicial authority given to
a federal department. Pursuant to Section 5, the DOJ "steps into the
shoes" of the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.42 There is no appeal from a DOJ decision granting or denying
preclearance4 3; however, if preclearance is denied the jurisdiction is
free to file a subsequent declaratory judgment action with the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.44 This delegation
of judicial authority to the DOJ has prevented countless illegal
changes in voting procedures and practices, forestalling the necessity
of filing actions pursuant to Section 2. The most important result is
that Section 5 has forced covered jurisdictions to work with the DOJ
in a cooperative manner to ensure compliance with the VRA, which
they now do mostly routinely. Today, most covered jurisdictions work
very willingly with the DOJ, providing requested information and
agreeing to minor adjustments, to ensure preclearance and protection
of the voters. Hence the reason for the lower number of objections in
recent years.
Despite the clear success of the VRA, particularly Section 5, many
covered jurisdictions continue to oppose the dictates of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the VRA, as is shown by the continuing number of
the DOJ objections, continuing litigation, and first hand accounts
noted in congressional testimony.4 5 As a result of this continued resis-
tance to following the Constitution, Section 5 has been renewed in
1970, 1975, 1982, and most recently in 2006, despite the fact that it was
intended to be temporary.46
Prior to introducing H.R. 9 and its companion Senate Bill S. 2703,
the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Consti-
tution, held ten oversight hearings between October 18, 2005 and May
40. Senate Report, supra note 1.
41. Id.
42. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10 (2006).
43. 28 C.F.R. § 51.49.
44. 28 C.F.R. § 51.11.
45. Senate Report, supra note 1, at pp. 12-15.
46. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314; Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat.
577.
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4, 2006, to examine the effectiveness of Sections 5 and 203,47 which
were scheduled to expire on August 6, 2007, according to their last
reauthorization in 1982.48 During the course of the oversight hearings,
the Subcommittee heard from thirty-nine witnesses, who included
state and local elected officials, scholars, attorneys, and other repre-
sentatives from the voting and civil rights communities.49 Addition-
ally, the Subcommittee received written testimony from the DOJ,
other interested governmental and non-governmental organizations,
and private citizens. In total, the Subcommittee assembled over 12,000
pages of testimony, documentary evidence, and appendices from over
sixty groups and individuals, including several members of Congress.
In addition to the extensive testimony, the Subcommittee requested,
received, and incorporated into its hearing record two comprehensive
reports compiled by non-governmental organizations 50 that possessed
expertise in voting rights litigation.5 ' These reports extensively docu-
mented: (1) the extent of discrimination against minorities in voting
which continues to occur; and (2) the continuing need for the provi-
sions of the VRA set to expire. The Subcommittee also requested,
received, and incorporated reports from eleven of the sixteen states
covered in whole or in part under Section 4 documenting the extent of
discrimination occurring in those states over the last twenty-five
512years. Those reports also describe the impact that the VRA has had
on protecting racial and language minority citizens from discrimina-
tory voting techniques in those jurisdictions.5 3
What the Subcommittee found was overwhelming: that not only was
it necessary to extend once again the provisions of the VRA that were
intended to be temporary, but it was also necessary to "fix" provisions
of Section 5 to clear up erroneous interpretations by the Supreme
Court,54 particularly those announced in Ashcroft and Bossier Parish11.55
On May 3, 2006, after the House Subcommittee submitted its find-
ings to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,56 the House and Sen-
47. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Hearing tran-
scripts available at http://judiciary.house.gov.
48. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., The National Commission on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Vot-
ers: The Voting Rights Act at Work, 1982-2005 (2006) available at www.votingrightsact.org/re-
port/finalreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. House Report, supra note 1.
55. Senate Report, supra note 1.
56. Id.
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ate introduced identical proposals to renew and amend the VRA,57
titled The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Vot-
ing Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.8 After
introduction, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held eight Com-
mittee and Subcommittee hearings. 9
Congressional findings in the final statute noted, inter alia, that ves-
tiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by
second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority60 voters
from fully participating in the electoral process... the evidence before
Congress reveals that 40 years has not been a sufficient amount of
time to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100
years of disregard for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to en-
sure that the right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed by
the Constitution ... [and] [tIhe record compiled by Congress demon-
strates that, without the continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
protections, racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of
the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes
diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the
last 40 years.
6 1
The congressional findings are sad, but true. Covered jurisdictions
still try old and new mechanisms to circumvent the Constitution. Fur-
ther, covered jurisdictions continue to attack Section 5's constitution-
ality.62 The Supreme Court has, to date, continued to uphold the
broad and uncommon exercise of congressional power embodied in
Section 5, despite the burden it places on the states and municipalities,
on the basis articulated by the Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. South
Carolina.63 While "[s]tates 'have broad powers to determine the con-
ditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised[,]' . . . such
insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instru-
ment for circumventing a federally protected right.",64 The Supreme
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For purposes of this article, use of the term "minority" is intended to refer to racial
minorities (people of color) and language minorities (persons with limited English proficiency),
who are registered to vote or eligible to be registered to vote and who are the intended benefi-
ciaries of the Voting Rights Act.
61. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, And Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization And Amendments Act Of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006) (em-
phasis added).
62. See, e.g., Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Gonzales, No.
1:06-cv-01384-PLF (D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 2006) (action seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgment
declaring Section 5 unconstitutional as an overextension of Congress' enforcement power to
remedy past violations of the Fifteenth Amendment).
63. History, Scope, and Purpose, supra note 13, at 4 (2005) (statement of Hon. Steve
Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution).
64. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
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Court noted that Congress was well within its constitutional authority
to enact a broad-ranging statute with broad remedies, to ensure that
the states adhered to the command issued by the Fifteenth
Amendment.65
Sadly, since Katzenbach, the Supreme Court has issued a number of
ill-conceived decisions that have weakened the effectiveness of the
VRA and the Attorney General's ability to enforce it, particularly
Section 5. More disconcerting is recent dicta by several justices that,
in effect, have invited covered jurisdictions to seek a partial overruling
of Katzenbach to declare Section 5 unconstitutional. 66
The House Judiciary Committee, in a vote of 33 to 1, approved H.R.
9.67 The House approved the legislation by a 390 to 33 margin, 68 and
the Senate approved S. 2703 by a vote of 98 to 0.69 On July 27, 2006,
President Bush signed into law The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks,
and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amend-
ments Act of 2006.70
III. RETROGRESSION GONE WILD - RENO V. BOSSIER PARISH II
In attempting to fix the problem created by the Supreme Court de-
cision in Bossier Parish II, Congress only managed to repair part of
the problem - the problem of the retrogression rule remains.
A. Origin and Impact of the Retrogression Rule
Simply defined, the Retrogression Rule requires the district court71
and the DOJ to limit the "effect" analysis under Section 5 to whether
the proposed voting change makes minority voters worse off than they
had been before the change, with respect to their opportunity to exer-
cise the electoral franchise effectively, irrespective of whether the prior
voting practice or procedure was itself a violation of the VRA. 72 This
rule is not found in the text of the VRA. It is an unreasonable extra-
65. Id.
66. See infra Section V.
67. Press Release, U.S. H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Committee Overwhelmingly Ap-
proves Voting Rights Act Extension (May 10, 2006) http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
VRAcmtepass51006.pdf.
68. Press Release, U.S. H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, House Overwhelmingly Approves
Sensenbrenner's Bipartisan Voting Rights Act Extension Legislation (July 13, 2006) http://judici-
ary.house.gov/media/pdfs/VRAHousepass71306.pdf.
69. Charles Babington, Voting Rights Act Extension Passes In Senate, 98 to 0, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 21, 2006, at Al.
70. Hamil R. Harris and Michael Abramowitz, Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Extension;
President Vows to Build on 'Legal Equality' Won in Civil Rights Era, THE WASHINGTON POST,
July 28, 2006, at A3.
71. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, references to "district court" shall refer to the
three-judge District Court of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
72. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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polation of the "effects" test which has made Section 5 analysis unnec-
essarily elaborate and has partially defeated the purpose of Section 5
- to save minority voters the trouble and expense of Section 2 litiga-
tion to fix an old problem. It is also particularly odd given the fact
that retrogression is not used in any other statute in which Congress
imposed an effects or impact test.
During 1975-76, and until enactment of H.R. 9, Section 5 required
covered jurisdictions seeking a declaratory judgment or administrative
preclearance 73 to affirmatively prove that the proposed voting change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contra-
vention of the guarantees set forth in [various sections of the
VRA]." 4 While Congress clearly intended for the "effects" test to be
utilized in Section 5 determinations, the Supreme Court decisions in
Beer75 and Bossier Parish H, discussed below, turned congressional
intent on its head.
In 1975, in City of Richmond v. United States,76 the Supreme Court
held that a change with no unlawful effect should still be denied
preclearance if it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.77 "An
official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the pur-
pose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no
legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute."7 City
of Richmond made sense. The next major decision makes no sense.
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Beer v. United States, held that the
Section 5 "effects" test required a showing of "retrogression. ' 79 The
issue in Beer was reapportionment of New Orleans's councilmanic dis-
tricts.80 In reversing the district court and upholding the plan, the Su-
preme Court in Beer found that "[t]he language of [Section 5] clearly
provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures.
'[D]iscriminatory practices ... instituted prior to November 1964...
are not subject to the requirement of preclearance [under Section
5].' "81 Put another way, the Court found that the purpose of Section 5
"has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be
73. The DOJ regulations define "preclearance" as either the obtaining of the declaratory
judgment described in Section 5, to the failure of the Attorney General to interpose an objection
pursuant to Section 5, or to the withdrawal of an objection by the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.2 (2006).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
75. Beer, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
76. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 378.
79. Beer, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
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made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minor-
ities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise."s 2
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Beer, correctly noted that the Court's
decision retreated from 10 years of jurisprudence that read Section 5
"expansively so as 'to give the Act the broadest possible scope' and to
reach 'any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered
State in even a minor way."' 83 Justice Marshall opined that the major-
ity "produces a convoluted construction of the statute that transforms
the single question suggested by [Section 5] into three questions, and
then provides precious little guidance in answering any of them." 4
Under the Court's reading of [Section 5], we cannot reach the
abridgment question unless we have first determined that a proposed
redistricting plan would "lead to a retrogression in the position of ra-
cial minorities ... in comparison to their position under the existing
plan. The Court's conclusion that [Section 5] demands this prelimi-
nary inquiry is simply wrong; it finds no support in the language of the
statute and disserves the legislative purposes behind [Section 5].
Implicitly admitting as much, the Court adds another question, this
one to be asked if the proposed plan is not "retrogressive": whether
"the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or
color as to violate the Constitution." This addition does much in the-
ory, at least to salvage the Court's test, since our decisions make clear
that the proper test of abridgment under [Section 5] is essentially the
constitutional inquiry. 5
Justice Marshall was correct in more ways than one. By finding that
Section 5 only prohibits "retrogression" in considering the "effect" of
a voting change, (making minority voters worse off than they had
been before the change with respect to their opportunity to exercise
the electoral franchise effectively, irrespective of whether the original
voting practice or procedure was a violation of the VRA), the Court
handcuffed the DOJ and the district court in analyzing the effect of a
proposed voting change in light of the current practice. This convo-
luted process is now embodied in the Section 5 implementing
regulations.8 6
The impact of the Beer holding is staggering. A previously discrimi-
natory system could withstand Section 5 scrutiny just because it ex-
isted before Section 4 coverage or simply because it was previously
82. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 567, 566 (1969)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 146.
86. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 51 (2006).
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approved by the DOJ or the district court, even if the previous ap-
proval was erroneous.
The government-issued only photo identification requirement
adopted by Georgia in 2005 is an excellent example of this point.87
Under this requirement, registered voters must present a government-
issued photo identification as the sole allowable prerequisite to being
permitted to vote in-person.88 After Georgia adopted the require-
ment and the DOJ precleared it,89 a lawsuit was filed challenging the
requirement. 90 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia issued a preliminary injunction blocking utilization
of the photo identification requirement. 91 During the pendency of the
litigation, the Georgia General Assembly adopted revisions to the
Georgia photo identification requirement.92 The revisions could only
be compared to the previously precleared government-issued only
photo identification requirement, rather than the whole picture of its
constitutional impact. In effect, the DOJ could not correct its earlier
mistake. The DOJ precleared the revision.93 The court permitted
plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of the precleared revi-
sion. 94 The federal action is currently stayed, with the injunction still
in effect, pending resolution of a similar state action. 95 Two lawsuits
and a lot of wasted resources were made necessary by the DOT's fail-
ure to block the rule in the first place and, because of Beer, its inabil-
ity to correct its mistake. This litigation demonstrates how the
87. Act of Apr. 22, 2005, 2005 Ga. Laws act 53, § 59 (codified as amended at GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-417 (2005)).
88. Id.
89. Preclearance Letter from John Tanner, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Dep't. of Justice, to Thurbert Baker, Attorney General, State of Georgia (Aug. 26, 2005) (in
State's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 3, Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005)).
90. Common Cause/Georgia, et al. v. Billups, et al, No. 05-0201 (N.D. Ga. filed Sep. 19,
2005).
91. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (order grant-
ing preliminary injunction and holding that the statute imposed an undue burden on voting and
constituted a poll tax).
92. Act of Jan. 26, 2006, 2006 Ga. Laws act 432, § 2 (codified as amended at GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-417 (2006)).
93. Preclearance Letter from John Tanner, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Thurbert Baker, Attorney General, State of Georgia (April 21, 2006)
(attached to Notice of Section 5 Preclearance of Act No. 432 (S.B. 84), Common Cause/Georgia
v. Billups, No. 05-0201 (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 21, 2006)).
94. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, No. 05-0201 (N.D. Ga. filed Mar. 20, 2006 (Order
Staying Action Pending DOJ Review and Allowing Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint if
DOJ Grants Preclearance); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, No. 05-0201 (N.D. Ga. filed Apr.
26, 2006) (second amended complaint).
95. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, No. 05-0201 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2006) (order grant-
ing Motion to Stay Proceedings pending Resolution of Appeal of the Superior Court of Fulton
County's Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction to the Georgia Supreme Court and
Stays all proceedings in this case).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [2007], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol29/iss2/4
236 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:224
decision in Beer forces plaintiffs to seek remedy under Section 2 or
other statutory or constitutional basis to eliminate an existing discrim-
inatory voting practice or procedure that could otherwise be corrected
through Section 5.
The Court in Beer, however, held that absence of retrogression
would not prevent an objection based on intentional discrimination
that would violate the Constitution.96 Even this rule did not last
forever.
B. Bossier Parish II Extreme on the Retrogression Rule
For many years, the Justice Department relied on Beer's statement
of the purpose test to deny preclearance to any changes that reflected
intentional racial discrimination, but the Supreme Court's decision in
Bossier Parish 1197 changed all this. Bossier Parish, a jurisdiction in
Louisiana covered by Section 5 of the VRA, is governed by a twelve-
member Police Jury.98 In the early 1990's, the Police Jury redrew its
electoral districts.99 The plan it adopted, like the plan then in effect,
contained no majority-black districts, although blacks made up ap-
proximately twenty percent of the parish's population. 100 The Police
Jury submitted its new districting plan to the Attorney General for
preclearance, and the plan was precleared. 10 1
Likewise, the Bossier Parish School Board decided to redraw its dis-
tricts after the 1990 census. 10 2 The president of the local chapter of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) proposed that the Board adopt a plan with majority-black
districts.103 However, the Board rejected that plan and adopted the
identical plan approved by the Police Jury. 104 The Board submitted
the same redistricting plan that the Police Jury submitted to the Attor-
ney General for preclearance, but the Attorney General objected to
the Board's plan asserting that the plan proposed by the NAACP
demonstrated that there were enough black residents to constitute a
majority in two single-member districts.105 After the Attorney Gen-
eral denied the Board's request for reconsideration, it filed an action
for declaratory judgment seeking approval of the 1992 plan in the
96. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 (1976).
97. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (Bossier Parish I1), 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
98. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471, 474 (1997).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district
court granted preclearance.' °6
During its first trip to the Supreme Court, Bossier Parish I, the
Court agreed with the district court that a proposed voting change
cannot be denied preclearance simply because it violated Section 2,
but disagreed with the proposition that all evidence of a dilutive (but
nonretrogressive) effect forbidden by Section 2 was irrelevant to
whether the Board enacted the plan with a retrogressive purpose for-
bidden by Section 5.1°7 Because some language in the district court's
opinion left the Supreme Court uncertain as to whether the district
court had in fact applied that proposition in its decision, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings as to the Board's
purpose in adopting the 1992 plan. 0 8 The Supreme Court left open
the additional question "whether the [Section 5] purpose inquiry ever
extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent."' °9 That is a dif-
ferent read from Beer. The existence of such a purpose, and its rele-
vance to Section 5, were issues to be decided on remand. 110
On remand the district court upheld the plan.11' On appeal of the
district court's subsequent decision, Bossier Parish II, appellants (DOJ
and intervenors) argued that although the Board's plan would have no
retrogressive effect because it did not worsen the position of minority
voters, the plan still violated Section 5 because Section 5 prohibits
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
non-retrogressive purpose.112 There was even testimony that two
school board members acknowledged that the redistricting plan re-
flected opposition to black representation of a black majority
district.1 13
However, the Supreme Court, in a shocking and debilitating deci-
sion, held that the language of Section 5 leads to the conclusion that
the "purpose" prong of Section 5 covers only retrogressive dilution,
and Section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of redistricting plans en-
acted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose114 Noting
that in Beer the Court held that a plan has a prohibited "effect" only if
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (Bossier Parish I1), 528 U.S. 320, 321 (2000).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; Voting Rights Act: Section 5 - Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 (2006) [hereinafter
Preclearance Standards Hearing] (statement of Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney at the Na-
tional Voting Rights Institute).
114. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (Bossier Parish 11), 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
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it is retrogressive, the Court went further to hold that Section 5 does
not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a dis-
criminatory but nonretrogressive purpose."5 So goes the intent ex-
ception in Beer.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bossier Parish II has received a lot
of criticism. The impact of the Supreme Court's decision on the
strength of the VRA was addressed during the Congressional hearings
on the renewal of Section 5. The major concern raised was that the
Supreme Court's decision weakened the ability of Section 5 to prevent
districts from enacting discriminatory voting practices. "I think that
Bossier is indeed like a cancer, eating away at the Voting Rights
Act."116
One criticism of Bossier Parish II was that the Supreme Court's de-
cision misconstrued the meaning of the discriminatory purpose test.1
17
As a result, the Court's decision drained the "purpose" test of any
practical meaning in the preclearance process."" "The plain meaning
of the word 'purpose' encompasses any and all discriminatory pur-
poses, not merely a purpose to cause retrogression."119 However, if
the purpose prong only covers a "retrogressive" purpose, a jurisdic-
tion that never had minority representation on its elected body could
continue to adopt new redistricting plans, intentionally designed to
freeze out minority voting strength, and Section 5 would provide no
protection. 20
[Tihe section 5 purpose test now only applies if, per chance, a jurisdic-
tion were to intend to cause a retrogression in minorities' electoral
opportunity, but somehow messes up and adopts a change that, in fact,
is not retrogressive. This is highly unlikely to occur, and in fact, in the
nearly 5 years since Bossier Parish was decided, the Justice Depart-
ment has reviewed approximately 76,000 voting changes and no such
incompetent retrogressor has appeared.' 2 1
Giving an example of the negative impact that Bossier Parish II had
on Section 5, Brenda Wright, managing attorney at the National Vot-
115. Id.
116. Preclearance Standards Hearing, supra note 113, at 64 (statement of Robert C. Scott,
Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution).
117. Id. at 16, 26 (statement of Mark A. Posner, Adjunct Professor, American University,
Washington College of Law) (statement of Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National Voting
Rights Institute).
118. Id. at 26 (statement of Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National Voting Rights
Institute).
119. Id. at 16 (statement of Mark A. Posner, Adjunct Professor, American University, Wash-
ington College of Law).
120. Id. at 19 (statement of Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National Voting Rights
Institute).
121. Id. at 7 (statement of Mark A. Posner, Adjunct Professor, American University, Wash-
ington College of Law).
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ing Rights Institute, used the Georgia Congressional election of 1986
as an example in her testimony.
If [the Supreme Court's interpretation of the purpose prong] had been
applied during the first 35 years of [S]ection 5's history, Congressman
John Lewis of Georgia probably would not have won election to the
U.S. Congress in 1986. In the early 1980s, Georgia enacted a discrimi-
natory congressional redistricting plan that fragmented the Black pop-
ulation in the Atlanta area. The Georgia legislator who headed the
redistricting committee openly declared his opposition to drawing so-
called Negro districts, except that he did not use the word 'Negro;' he
used the racial epithet. Because of the clear evidence of racism be-
hind the plan, the Justice Department objected even though the plan
was not retrogressive. Georgia then redrew the district and the result
was that Congressman Lewis was able to win election. But under the
Bossier Parish decision, the Department of Justice would have been
obliged to approve Georgia's original discriminatory plan.122
Similarly, Jerome Gray, the state field director of the Alabama
Democratic Conference, cited Dillard v. Crenshaw as an example of
what could happen to minority representation under the Bossier Par-
ish II standard.123 In Dillard, in a number of jurisdictions throughout
Alabama, school boards, city councils, and county commissions were
sued. 124 Before the Dillard v. Crenshaw lawsuit, none of those gov-
erning bodies had black representation. 2 5 Consent decrees were is-
sued in many of those cases to convert to single-member districts. 26
However, in about three dozen of those cases, the consent decrees
were not codified. 1217 If the Bossier Parish II standard was applied, all
of those places where there was no black representation would stand
to lose representation. 2 8
Another problem cited in congressional testimony with Bossier Par-
ish II was that it undercuts the ability of the Justice Department and
the District Court for the District of Columbia to employ Section 5 to
block the implementation of discriminatory changes.129 The decline in
the number of Section 5 objections based solely on discriminatory in-
tent since the Court's decision is an example of the impact that Boss-
122. Id. at 25-26 (statement of Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National Voting Rights
Institute).
123. Id. at 54-55 (statement of Jerome A. Gray, State Field Director, Alabama Democratic
Conference).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 7 (statement of Mark A. Posner, Adjunct Professor, American University, Wash-
ington College of Law).
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ier Parish II has had on the effectiveness of Section 5.130 In the 1980s
and 1990s, before the Bossier Parish H decision, over 200 Section 5
objections were based solely on racially discriminatory intent. 13 ' By
contrast, in the first four- and-a-half years after the Bossier Parish II
decision, only two objections were based solely on intent. 132
In short, in Bossier Parish II, the Supreme Court took the illogic of
Beer to a ridiculous extreme.
IV. GEORGIA V. ASHCROFT - ATTACK ON MAJORITY
MINORITY DISTRICTS
Prior to 2003, voting changes submitted under Section 5 were evalu-
ated under the retrogressive standard, as set forth in the 1976 case of
Beer v. United States, which ensures that "the ability of minority voters
to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of choice
is not diminished by the voting change."'1 33 The Beer decision defined
retrogression as a failure to preserve the ability of minority voters to
elect candidates of their choice."' This touchstone, relatively clear
"ability to elect" standard, was ratified when the Congress extended
Section 5 in 1982 and was consistently applied by the courts and the
DOJ for more than a quarter century.1
35
This was the standard until 2003, when the Supreme Court deviated
from the "straightforward retrogressive application" in Ashcroft
1 36
and replaced it with a more "amorphous approach." '137 Upholding
Georgia's state senate redistricting plan, the Supreme Court, in a 5 to
4 decision, determined that a retrogression analysis requires a "total-
ity of the circumstances" evaluation, not just the "comparative ability
of minorities to elect candidates of their choice," when determining
whether a plan is retrogressive under Section 5.13S
130. Id.
131. Id. at 27 (statement of Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National Voting Rights
Institute).
132. Id.
133. Voting Rights Act: The Judicial Evolution of the Retrogression Standard: Hearing on
H.R. 9 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) [hereinafter Retrogres-
sion Standard Hearing] (statement of Steve Chabot, Chairman, House Comm. on the
Constitution).
134. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 4 (statement of John Conyers, Jr.,
Member, House Comm. on the Constitution, and Ranking Member, House Comm. on the
Judiciary).
135. Id. at 4-5 (statement of John Conyers, Jr., Member, House Comm. on the Constitution,
and Ranking Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
136. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
137. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 5 (statement of Melvin L. Watt,
Member, House Comm. on the Constitution).
138. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482.
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The "totality of the circumstances" test was adopted by Congress in
Section 2 cases in its 1982 amendments to the VRA to address
problems created by a line of Supreme Court decisions that overruled
previous precedent that discriminatory effect was just as actionable
under Section 2 as discriminatory intent.139 There is no way that the
Court can with a straight face use totally different analyses in Section
5 (retrogression) and Section 2 (totality of the circumstances) cases,
while at the same time using a Section 2 analysis to restrict the effec-
tiveness of Section 5. That, however, is what the Court did in Ash-
croft. Justice O'Connor described the perversion of retrogression as
follows:
In order to maximize the electoral success of a minority group, a State
may choose to create a certain number of 'safe' districts, in which it is
highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of
their choice .... Alternatively, a State may choose to create a greater
number of districts in which it is likely - although perhaps not quite as
likely as under the benchmark plan - that minority voters will be able
to elect candidates of their choice. 140
The Ashcroft decision had real and immediate retrogressive effects.
For example, in the 44th Georgia House of Representatives district,
Billy McKinney, a long-time incumbent black legislator saw the voting
strength of black voters reduced by approximately seventeen percent-
age points as a result of the precleared plan. In the next Democratic
primary, he faced a relatively unknown white challenger and was
defeated. 141
In Congressional testimony, several criticisms of the Ashcroft deci-
sion were given. Ted Shaw noted that one problem with Ashcroft is
that it permits tangible minority gains to be sacrificed.1 42 Reviewing
Justice O'Connor's dictum, Ted Shaw noted that the Court's decision
"permits a jurisdiction to choose among different theories of represen-
tation and introduces a substantial uncertainty for minority communi-
ties into a statute that was specifically intended to block persistent and
shifting efforts to limit the effectiveness of minority political
participation." 143
Tyrone Brooks, member of the Georgia General Assembly, testified
that people have asked him what new strategies and schemes states
139. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) for a full discussion of the 1982 amend-
ments to Section 2. See also, House Report, supra note 1.
140. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480.
141. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 31 (statement of Anne Lewis, Att'y,
Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP).
142. Id. at 13 (statement of Theodore M. Shaw, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
143. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 13 (statement of Theodore M. Shaw,
President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
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would come up with to suppress the minority vote. Brooks opined
that "[m]y state [Georgia] didn't bother to come up with anything
new, but reenacted one of the most blatant measures adopted after
Reconstruction to suppress the black vote - the poll tax"144-referring
to the Georgia photo identification requirement and its required
fees. 14 5 Representative Brooks added that "there was no evidence
whatever presented to the legislature of the need for a photo identifi-
cation requirement for in-person voting. ' 146 Yet, as noted above, the
DOJ, relying in part on Ashcroft, precleared the requirement. 147
Moreover, Brooks testified that eliminating majority black districts in
Georgia would drastically lower the chances of black officials being
elected to office.
As a long time member of the Georgia legislature and current chair of
the Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials, I can confidently
say that if we abolished the majority black districts for the state legis-
lature, we would do away with most of the black legislators. The same
would be true of black elected officials at the county and local
levels. 148
The Court's opinion has been criticized for allowing states to turn
black and other minority voters into second-class voters who can in-
fluence the election of white candidates, but who cannot elect their
preferred candidates, including candidates of their own race.'4 9 "If
you ask any voter whether that voter wants the ability to be able to
influence who may be sitting at the table when legislation is made, as
opposed to the ability to actually have a voice in choosing who's going
to be at the table, I think the latter is a clear choice."'150 Brooks stated
that "the ability to influence the election of candidates is not an ac-
ceptable substitute for the ability to elect."'' Ted Shaw testified that
the problem with the Ashcroft decision is that it moves away from the
144. Id. at 38 (statement of The Honorable Tyrone L. Brooks, Sr., Member, Georgia General
Assembly).
145. See the Georgia Photo identification statute discussed above, supra note 87.
146. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 38 (statement of Tyrone L. Brooks,
Sr., Member, Georgia General Assemb. and President, Georgia Association of Black Elected
Officials).
147. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
148. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 39 (statement of Tyrone L. Brooks,
Sr., Member, Georgia General Assemb. and President, Georgia Association of Black Elected
Officials).
149. Id. at 49 (testimony of Laughlin McDonald, Director, Voting Rights Project, American
Civil Liberties Union, FND).
150. Id. at 57 (testimony of Theodore M. Shaw, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
151. Id. at 40 (statement of Tyrone L. Brooks, Sr., Member, Georgia General Assembly. and
President, Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials).
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goal of pursuing full participation in the political process by racial mi-
nority groups. 15
2
The lack of electoral success of black candidates in majority-white
legislative districts in Georgia is an example of the inability of blacks
to exercise the franchise effectively in so-called "influence dis-
tricts." ' 3 As of 2002, all of the ten blacks elected to the state senate
in Georgia were elected from districts with populations that were
fifty-four to sixty-six percent black. Of the thirty-seven blacks elected
to the state house, thirty-four were elected from majority-black dis-
tricts. Two of the three who were elected from majority-white districts
were long-term incumbents in districts where the percentage of black
voters were in excess of forty-five percent and the third was elected
from a three-seat district, meaning that every voter could elect three
members to the house.
154
Congressman Watt agreed with the Ashcroft Court that Section 5
does not prevent jurisdictions from reducing super majority minority
voting age population percentages from that in a benchmark plan.
155
However, Congressman Watt, along with some of the other witnesses,
argued that the Court's decision replaces a clear standard with an un-
clear standard. "Where the majority in Ashcroft strayed, however,
losing four justices in the process, was in its failure to enunciate an
articulable standard under which the opportunities to elect are
preserved."'' 56
The Court held that "[i]n assessing the comparative weight of these
influence districts, it is important to consider 'the likelihood that can-
didates elected without decisive minority support would be willing to
take the minority's interest into account."' This type of inquiry is crit-
icized as being extremely subjective and focusing on incumbents
rather than voters.1 5
7
Ashcroft invites and shields vote dilution. 15 8 Before Ashcroft, Sec-
tions 2 and 5 were safeguards against voter dilution. However, these
safeguards have been compromised as a result of the Ashcroft deci-
sion because "the minority influence theory ... is frequently nothing
152. Id. at 58 (testimony of Theodore M. Shaw, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
153. Id. at 49 (testimony of Laughlin McDonald, Director, Voting Rights Project, American
Civil Liberties Union, FND).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 5 (testimony of Melvin L. Watt, Member, House Comm. on the Constitution).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 35 (testimony of Anne Lewis, Attorney, Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP).
158. Id. at 13 (testimony of Theodore M. Shaw, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
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more than a guise for diluting minority voting strength. ' 159 For exam-
ple, the white members of the Georgia legislature opposed the crea-
tion of a majority-black congressional district in 1981 on the grounds
that it would diminish minority influence. The state legislature said it
would cause white flight and the disruption of harmonious working
relationships between the races. The three-judge court said that the
so-called diminution of minority influence was actually a pretext, and
that the refusal of the state legislature to create a majority-black dis-
trict in the Atlanta metropolitan area was "the product of purposeful
racial discrimination." 6 ° There is concern that the technique of
spreading minority voters among more districts, which dilutes the col-
lective power of their votes, is likely to increase as a result of the en-
dorsement of the so-called "influence districts" in the Ashcroft
opinion. 6'
Another problem with the Court's decision is that an influence-
based Section 5 standard is difficult to administer.1 62 Ted Shaw sug-
gested that the Court's decision leaves more questions unanswered
than answered.163 One of the main questions that Ashcroft leaves un-
answered is "how does the DOJ or court establish a metric that indi-
cates how much 'influence' must be gained to trade off against a
reduction in the ability-to-elect?"'
V. THE Fix
H.R. 9 amended Section 5 to read as follows, with underlining indi-
cating added text and strikethrough indicating deleted text:
(a) Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which
the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based
upon determinations made under the first sentence of section
1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or politi-
cal subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in
section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made
under the second sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in
effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with re-
159. Id. at 54 (testimony of Laughlin McDonald, Director, Voting Rights Project, American
Civil Liberties Union, FND).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 5 (testimony of Melvin L. Watt, Member, House Comm. on the Constitution).
162. Id. at 13 (testimony of Theodore M. Shaw, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
163. Id. at 25.
164. Id. at 26.
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spect to voting different from that in force or effect on November
1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title
based upon determinations made under the third sentence of sec-
tion 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to ad-
minister any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or
subdivision may institute an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
d.es ;t have the purpse a-nd ;iA11 net have the eff-e- neither has
the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and
unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be
denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualifica-
tion, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, pre-
requisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by
the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General
has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such sub-
mission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited ap-
proval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney
General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be
made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General
that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure
to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section
shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such quali-
fication, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the
event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objec-
tion will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a
submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reex-
amine the submission if additional information comes to his atten-
tion during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would
otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any
action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284
of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(b) Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or
will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the
United States on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, to elect their
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preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote
within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The term "purpose" in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall
include any discriminatory purpose.
(d) The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to protect the abil-
ity of such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice."3-
A. Reno v. Bossier Parish II
H.R. 9 modified Section 5 to restore the pre-Bossier Parish II dis-
criminatory purpose standard. The new subsection (c) to Section 5
added reads as follows: "The term 'purpose' in subsections (a) and (b)
of this section shall include any discriminatory purpose." '16 6 Debo
Adegbile, Associate Director of Litigation of the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc., testified, "[t]his modification would
allow the DOJ, or the reviewing three-judge panel, to interpose objec-
tions or deny declaratory judgments in situations where sufficient evi-
dence of discriminatory intent exists such that the submitting
jurisdiction cannot meet its Section 5 burden." '167
Moreover, the modification to Section 5 accomplishes another im-
portant goal. Bossier Parish II is founded on the Court's interpreta-
tion of the statutory language. 168 Likewise, in Bossier Parish I the
Court used Congress's failure to clarify Section 5's statutory language
to justify its decision that the effects prong was limited to "retrogres-
sive" effects.169 "The modification to Section 5 in H.R. 9 is intended
to avoid any implication that Congress ratified the Bossier II ruling by
aligning the purpose prong with constitutional standards."17
This is an important fix to Section 5. However, the Beer standard of
retrogression remains. It was unfortunate that the retrogression doc-
trine was not removed in 1982 or 2006. From this author's conversa-
tions with those who worked on reauthorization and changes to
Section 5, they noted the composition of Congress and the reality of
making a tactical decision as to what battles are winnable when Sec-
tion 5 was set to expire in 2007. This fact is exacerbated by the fact
that Congress did not eliminate the Beer analysis in its 1982 amend-
ments. For now, we are stuck with the Beer analysis and the convo-
luted DOJ regulations incorporating the Beer analysis. This is by no
means to devalue the importance of eliminating the Bossier Parish II
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (emphasis added).
167. May 4, 2006 Hearing, supra note 4, at 45 (testimony of Debo P. Adegbile, Associate
Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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problem-it is imperative. It is sad, however, that Congress did not go
further and eliminate the Beer analysis so that the DOJ, the District
court and community activists could use Section 5 instead of resorting
to more costly Section 2 litigation.
B. Georgia v. Ashcroft
Likewise, H.R. 9's modification to Section 5 corrects "the unwar-
ranted shift in statutory interpretation" as a result of the Ashcroft de-
cision by restoring the ability to elect standard. 71 H.R. 9 added new
subsections (b) and (d) to Section 5 that read as follows:
(b) Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, or
practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or
will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the
United States on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees section forth in section 1973b(f)(2), to elect their preferred
candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote within the
meaning of subsection (a) of this section.
(d) The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to protect the abil-
ity of such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice."'
This amendment should eliminate the "totality of the circum-
stances" excuse to dilute minority voter strength out of the Section 5
analysis and require the non-approval of dilution plans.
C. Section 203 Improvements
Section 203 requires non-English voting materials be provided to
assist citizens in certain jurisdictions where at least five percent of the
voting age population consists of a single-language, limited English
proficient minority or where at least 10,000 voting-age citizens are lim-
ited English-proficient. 173 H.R. 9 extends the VRA's minority lan-
guage requirements for a period of twenty-five years. 174
VI. THE COMING ATACK ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 5
There are two distressing lessons of 1982 and 2006: (1) the VRA,
especially the temporary provisions such as Section 5, are very much
still needed to stop recalcitrant states and jurisdictions from their con-
tinuing attempts to disenfranchise racial and language minorities; and
171. Id. at 49.
172. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(b) and (d) (2006) (emphasis added).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A).
174. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
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(2) court opposition to the VRA will continue requiring Congress to
take steps to fix messes created by the Supreme Court.
On the second point there is much to worry about. Since Katzen-
bach,17 5 when the Supreme Court, inter alia, upheld the constitutional-
ity of Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA, and Miller v. Johnson17 6 when
Section 5 was reaffirmed, the composition of the Supreme Court has
changed and several sitting justices have hinted their belief that Sec-
tion 5's constitutionality is suspect - in a real sense, they have invited
a constitutional attack on Section 5 as an unwarranted intrusion on
state rights.177 Justice Scalia alluded to constitutional concerns,178 as
has Justice Thomas.1 79
The invitation has been accepted. Northwest Austin Municipal Util-
ity District Number One v. Gonzales, attacking the constitutionality of
Section 5, is scheduled to be heard before a three-judge panel of the
District Court for the District of Columbia later in 2007.180 The dis-
trict court's decision, in either direction, can be appealed directly to
the Supreme Court which by statute is required to hear the case.
Bossier Parish H and Ashcroft were decided by a vote of 5 to 4. A 5
to 4 vote destroying Section 5 is extremely likely. It is likely but non-
sensical. While the Court in recent years has been holding Congress's
feet to the fire to find a constitutional basis for its legislation, what
clearer basis exists than Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment? Also,
the extensive findings by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
showing to an absolute certainty the continued need for Section 5
should be more than enough to show that Congress has "done its
homework." Yet, given the clear hostility to voting rights and civil
rights by so many justices on the Court, the picture does not look
good.
175. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
176. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
177. See Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Gonzales, No. 06-
01384-PLF (D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 2006).
178. In Reno v. Bossier Parish H, Justice Scalia wrote:
In sum, by suggesting that § 5 extends to discriminatory but nonretrogressive vote-dilutive
purposes, appellants ask us to do what we declined to do in Bossier Parish I: to blur the
distinction between § 2 and § 5 by "shifting the focus of § 5 from nonretrogression to vote
dilution, and ... changing the § 5 benchmark from a jurisdiction's existing plan to a hypo-
thetical, undiluted plan." Such a reading would also exacerbate the "substantial" federalism
costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising con-
cerns about § 5's constitutionality. Most importantly, however, in light of our holding in
Beer, appellants' reading finds no support in the language of § 5.
Reno v. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 341 (Thomas, J., concurring).
180. Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv-01384-PLF
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 2006) (scheduling order entered December 1, 2006).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"[C]an you define for me, Mr. Shaw, your vision for what the, I'll
say, the optimum circumstances might be where we could sit here one
day . . .and say, '[w]e don't need the Voting Rights Act any more;
America is now assimilated and we are all one people'?" 8 '
When we no longer ... face[ ] the phenomenon of racially-polarized
voting, in which consistently.., the candidates of choice of the minor-
ity community will lose in a majority-White district, then I think we
can lay down parts, if not more than parts, of the Voting Rights
Act .... [B]ut we're clearly not there now.' 82
To Ted Shaw's eloquent statement, I would add "read the newspa-
pers ... this will not happen in our lifetimes."
H.R. 9's passage was a great victory for minority voters. It could
have gone further. Perhaps it could not go further given the looming
"concerns" expressed by Justices of the Supreme Court. Litigation to
attack, again, the constitutionality was inevitable. It is a type of forum
shopping and plaintiff shopping. With the passage of time and
changes on the bench, try again. The only issue at this point is
whether there is a 5 to 4 vote in favor of minority voters or against.
It is clear that Section 5 is a powerful take-away from certain states.
However, Article VI of the Constitution (the Supremacy Clause)
overrules local egos. At the end of the day, if states do not want to be
under Section 5, they should try obeying the Constitution in the first
place.
181. Retrogression Standard Hearing, supra note 133, at 58 (statement of Steve King, Mem-
ber, Subcommittee on the Constitution).
182. Id. (statement of Theodore M. Shaw, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.).
2007]
26
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [2007], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol29/iss2/4
